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Introduction
This paper is divided into three sections:
• Section I is largely descriptive and provides a brief inventory
of the agencies that use health technology assessment (HTA)
in Australia. First, the use of HTA by the Therapeutic
Goods Administration (TGA) is discussed. The TGA is the
principal agency regulating the availability and marketing
of therapeutic products in Australia. An overview of the
structure of the health-care system in Australia is then pre-
sented to provide a basis for understanding the subsequent
discussion on the use of HTA by reimbursement agencies
in Australia. The agencies in Australia that have the most
highly developed and formalized systems incorporating
HTA, including economic evaluation, are the Medical Ser-
vices Advisory Committee (MSAC) and the Pharmaceutical
Beneﬁts Advisory Committee (PBAC). Thus, further details
of the requirements of assessments that are undertaken to
inform reimbursement decisions made by these committees
are then presented.
• In Section II, the Australian situation with regard to a
number of current issues in the conduct and use of HTA is
discussed and represents our personal views.
• Section III is judgmental and represents our personal views
on lessons learned from the HTA experience in Australia. It
discusses the Australian situation with regard to a number
of current issues in the conduct and use of HTA.
SECTION I: HTA AND ITS USE IN
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS IN AUSTRALIA
Overview of the Use of HTA by Regulatory Agencies
in Australia
The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, which came into effect on
February 15, 1991, was introduced with the objective of provid-
ing a national framework for the regulation of therapeutic goods
in Australia to ensure the quality, safety, and efﬁcacy of medicines
and ensure the quality, safety, and performance of medical
devices. The Therapeutic Goods Act 1989, Regulations and
Orders set out the requirements for inclusion of therapeutic
goods in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods (ARTG),
including advertising, labeling, product appearance, and appeal
guidelines. The TGA, which is part of the Australian Govern-
ment’s Department of Health and Ageing, is responsible for
administering the provisions of the legislation. Some provisions
in relation to medicines, such as the scheduling of substances and
the safe storage of therapeutic goods, are covered by the relevant
state or territory legislation.
The TGA carries out a range of assessment and monitoring
activities to ensure that therapeutic goods available in Australia
are of an acceptable standard. The approach adopted with
respect to the assessment and monitoring activities conducted by
the TGA differs slightly across the regulation of various medici-
nal products and medical devices. There are two levels of entry
into the ARTG—“registered” products and “listed” products.
All products that are classiﬁed as “registrable” by the TGA must
undergo a detailed premarket risk assessment and evaluation by
the TGA. Products that are “listed” on the ARTG are not subject
to premarket evaluation because the TGA has determined, on the
basis of a risk assessment, that the products are low risk.
The identiﬁcation, analysis, and evaluation of risks associated
with registrable medicines involve a number of steps. For details,
see HTA: Reﬂections from the Antipodes Value in Health
Supplementary Information, Part I at: http://www.ispor.org/
publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp.
Overview of the Structure of the Health-Care System
in Australia
The Australian health system comprises a mixture of public and
private sector health service providers and is funded by a range of
mechanisms. Figure 1 depicts the source of funding by health
service type [1].
Individuals make ﬁnancial contributions to the health-care
system through taxes and an additional levy (Medicare levy),
which is based on their income, and through private ﬁnancing
(either directly and/or through purchase of private health
insurance).
Approximately 70% of total health expenditure in Australia
is funded by government, with the federal government contrib-
uting two-thirds of this and state, territory and local govern-
ments the other third [2]. The federal government’s major
contributions include the two national subsidy schemes: Medi-
care Beneﬁts Schedule (MBS) and the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts
Scheme (PBS). These two schemes subsidize medical services
(including optometry, psychology, pathology, and radiography
services) and prescription medicines, respectively, for all Austra-
lians. State governments together with the federal government
fund public hospital services (including emergency and outpa-
tient services) and residential care for aged and disabled persons.
The aim of the national health-care funding system is to give all
Australians, regardless of their personal circumstances, access to
health care at an affordable cost or at no cost, while allowing
choice for individuals through substantial private sector involve-
ment in delivery and ﬁnancing [3].
Government also provides the following public health
services:
1. immunization services and other communicable disease
control (including biosecurity);
2. public health education campaigns (including health pro-
motion in the areas of nutrition and physical activity);
3. injury prevention activities;
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4. programs to reduce the use and harmful effects of tobacco,
alcohol, and illicit drugs;
5. environmental monitoring and control; and
6. screening programs for diseases such as breast cancer and
cervical cancer.
Services provided by dentists and other private sector health
professionals such as physiotherapists, chiropractors, and
natural therapists are generally funded directly by patients (with
the support of private health insurance in circumstances where
the patient is insured for the provision of such services).
Overview of the Use of HTA by Reimbursement
Agencies in Australia
In Australia, as with most countries, the available health budget
does not permit all patients in all circumstances to have sub-
sidized access to the best possible health care. Therefore,
reimbursement agencies have the responsibility of rationing of
health-care resources. There is increasing pressure for health-care
policymakers to provide explicit justiﬁcation for their resource
allocation decisions. This has resulted in a movement toward the
use of HTA (including economic evaluation) to inform such
decision-making, particularly in regard to whether a technology
should be publicly subsidized. Interventions that are demon-
strated to be effective and cost-effective compared with current
practice are more likely to be subsidized than those for whom
such evidence is not available. It also needs to be acknowledged,
Nevertheless, that despite this increasing pressure for explicit
justiﬁcation of resource allocation decisions, HTA (including
economic evaluation) is used by reimbursement agencies in Aus-
tralia to varying extents to aid decision-making as to whether a
technology should be publicly subsidized or not. The extent of
assessment varies by health service type and the funder.
The strongest examples of the use of HTA (including eco-
nomic evaluation) are at the federal level where it is currently
pivotal to the processes by which screening programs, medical
interventions, pharmaceuticals, and vaccines are made available
under national subsidy programs in Australia.
The MSAC advises the Minister for Health and Ageing on
the strength of evidence relating to the safety, effectiveness, and
cost-effectiveness of new and emerging medical services and tech-
nologies and under what circumstances public funding should be
supported. The PBAC makes recommendations to the minister as
to the pharmaceutical preparations (including vaccines) that
should be subsidized. The PBAC is required by legislation to give
consideration to the effectiveness and cost of therapy involving
the use of the product, including by comparing the effectiveness
and cost of that therapy with that of alternative therapies [4].
The processes for HTA for items that are to be considered by
MSAC and PBAC are highly developed and formalized. For
details of the requirements of assessments that are undertaken to
inform these decision-makers are discussed below. For details,
see HTA: Reﬂections from the Antipodes Value in Health
Supplementary Information, Part II at: http://www.ispor.org/
publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp.
Although decision-making regarding availability of technolo-
gies in public hospitals may be informed by HTA, less formal
processes and less demanding requirements for these assessments
are applied. Currently, there is no centralized assessment of
health technologies (including drugs) that are proposed for use in
hospitals. Most hospitals have therapeutics committees which
consider requests to have drugs included on the hospital formu-
lary, but the degree of assessment is generally less rigorous than
the assessments required by MSAC and PBAC. Processes for
availability of medical services and technologies in hospitals are
generally less transparent than with drugs. This decentralized
approach has the potential to result in differences in availability
of health-care technologies across a state and even more so across
the country. Over recent years, there have been some moves
toward centralization of decision-making with respect to the
adoption of technologies in hospitals. For example, the Victorian
Department of Human Services has established the Victorian
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Other e.g., worker's compensation, 3rd party motor vehicle 
insurance (total: $3,694 million)
Individuals (total: $16,335 mill ion)
Health insurance funds (total: $6,835 million)
State/Territory and local government (total: $21,144 million)
Commonwealth government (total: $39,274 million)
Figure 1 Source of funding by health service type (2006–2007) $millions.
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Policy Advisory Committee on Clinical Practice and Technology
to consider and make recommendations regarding the applica-
tion of new and existing technologies and clinical practices in
Victorian public health services. Centralization of processes
could eliminate much of the duplication of effort by individual
hospitals in determining whether a drug or technology should be
made available and could result in more equitable access to
health-care resources across the country. Some of the resources
that are freed by elimination of duplication of effort could be
directed toward the conduct of more rigorous assessments.
In the related area of prostheses, private health insurers are
required, under the Private Health Insurance Act 2007, to pay
beneﬁts for a range of prostheses that are provided as part of an
episode of hospital treatment or hospital substitute treatment for
which a patient has cover and for which a Medicare beneﬁt is
payable for the associated professional service [5]. Prostheses
include cardiac pacemakers and deﬁbrillators, cardiac stents, hip
and knee replacements, and intraocular lenses, as well as human
tissues such as human heart valves, corneas, bones (part and
whole), and muscle tissue. The Prostheses List contains prosthe-
ses and human tissue prostheses and the beneﬁt to be paid by the
private health insurers. For details on listing and prothesis of
devices, see HTA: Reﬂections from the Antipodes Value in Health
Supplementary Information, Part III at: http://www.ispor.org/
publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp. The Pros-
theses Devices Committee (PDC) is a ministerially appointed
committee that makes recommendations to the federal minister
on which prostheses should be included on the Prostheses List
and the beneﬁt payable. The PDC is not required to assess
the cost-effectiveness of a device or prostheses before making a
recommendation of listing or as the basis for determining the
beneﬁt. In setting up and changing the existing arrangements for
listing prostheses and devices, the Federal Minister for Health
and Ageing was focusing on establishing the need for relative
clinical efﬁcacy as a basis for listing with the aim that this would
establish a base for which future cost-effectiveness assessment
may be applied [6].
With respect to health technologies used in aged care, the
federal government, in its 2007–2008 budget [7], announced an
initiative to increase the availability and use of “assistive tech-
nology,” which refers to devices that could improve the indepen-
dence of frail older people and help them remain safely in their
own homes for as long as possible (e.g., devices that remotely
monitor vital signs, systems to help people remember their medi-
cation). The measure establishes an industry body to promote the
use of assistive technology by community care providers and to
generate buying power for the large number of community care
services. As there does not appear to be any requirement for the
assessment of health technology in this process, it is likely that it
will be used to a minimal degree to inform the selection of
assistive technologies to be purchased.
Turning to health promotion, the federal government
announced in its 2003 budget [8] that to ensure clear and informed
decision-making, a formal priority setting mechanism for evalu-
ating potential investment in disease prevention and health pro-
motion would be established. In its annual report for 2003/2004,
the Department of Health and Ageing reported that this mecha-
nism had been successfully implemented; Nevertheless, no further
details are available in the public domain about this mechanism.
Overview of the Use of HTA in PBAC Processes
The PBAC is an independent statutory body established on May
12, 1954 under Section 101 of the National Health Act 1953 to
make recommendations and give advice to the minister about
which pharmaceutical preparations (including vaccines) should
be publicly subsidized under the PBS or, in the case of vaccines,
under the National Immunization Program Schedule (NIPS).
Submissions requesting the inclusion of a pharmaceutical
product (or vaccine) on the PBS (or NIPS) are generally prepared
by the manufacturer of the product, who holds the necessary
data required to assess the effectiveness, safety, and cost-
effectiveness of the product. Nevertheless, submissions from
medical bodies, health professionals, and private individuals and
their representatives are also considered. The PBAC has pub-
lished comprehensive guidelines [9] to guide the preparation of
submissions. The most recent version of the guidelines was
released by the PBAC in December 2006. It is important to
understand the purpose of the guidelines. The guidelines were
developed to communicate to stakeholders the considerations
that the PBAC makes in deciding whether a pharmaceutical
should be publicly subsidized. The guidelines should not be inter-
preted as a set of prescriptive rules to follow, but instead, a
reﬂection of the approaches that are likely to inﬂuence the PBAC
to recommend a product for inclusion on the PBS. The guidelines
are also intended to promote and reﬂect best practice in clinical
and economic evaluation. Adherence to the guidelines across
submissions promotes comparability across submissions and
assists in identiﬁcation of uncertainty for the PBAC.
The PBAC guidelines essentially request the presentation of
detailed HTA and request the presentation of speciﬁc details
in a submission. For PBAC guideline details, see HTA:
Reﬂections from the Antipodes Value in Health Supplemen-
tary Information, Part II at: http://www.ispor.org/publications/
value/ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp. Drugs that are recom-
mended by the PBAC for listing on the PBS fall into one of three
categories—“unrestricted,” “restricted beneﬁt,” and “authority
required.” The latter two types of listing are used by the PBAC to
target use to speciﬁc indications, patient groups, or clinical set-
tings where optimum clinical beneﬁt and cost-effectiveness are
achieved [10]. To access the drugs, the patient’s doctor is
required to conﬁrm that the patient satisﬁes the criteria speciﬁed
in the listing.
Patients are required to pay a copayment for drugs subsidized
on the PBS and the government pays the rest. In 2009, there
will be two copayment levels, “general” ($32.90) and “conces-
sional” ($5.30), with the latter being for patients who are on
social security or have other concessional status. This is the
maximum price that a patient is required to pay for a PBS-listed
drug dispensed at a pharmacy (Nevertheless, patients may pay
more if they choose a brand of product that attracts a brand
premium; where there are two or more brands of the same drug
on the PBS, the Government subsidizes each brand to the cost of
the lowest priced brand). Where drugs listed on the PBS are
priced less than the patient copayment, then, patients just pay the
cost of the drugs and the government makes no contribution.
Overview of the Use of HTA in Medicare Services
Advisory Committee Processes
In its 1997–1998 federal budgets, the Government announced a
measure aimed at improving health outcomes for patients by
ensuring that new and existing medical procedures attracting
Medicare beneﬁts are supported by evidence of their safety, clini-
cal effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness. A key element of this
measure was the establishment of a new body, the MSAC, whose
role is to advise the Federal Minister for Health and Ageing
about the strength of evidence relating to new medical technolo-
gies and procedures and the circumstances under which, funding
via the MBS should be supported.
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The MBS lists and provides information on the professional
services subsidized by Medicare. The assessment cycle for inclu-
sion of a technology or service in the MBS involves ﬁve stages
from application to possible funding. For details, see HTA: Reﬂec-
tions from the Antipodes Value in Health Supplementary
Information, Part IV at: http://www.ispor.org/publications/value/
ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp. MSAC publishes two sets of
guidelines (one for medical services and the other for diagnostic
services). The guidelines are intended for use by applicants and by
independent contractors. The MSAC guidelines, like the PBAC
guidelines, essentially request the presentation of a detailed
HTA.
HTAs (i.e., evaluations of the safety, clinical effectiveness, and
cost-effectiveness of the technology) are produced by indepen-
dent contractors (evaluators) in consultation with an “Advisory
Panel.” The MSAC appoints a specialist advisory panel, chaired
by a member of the MSAC, to assist in the assessment of each
health technology. This panel provides expert input into the
assessment process as well as ensures that the contractor’s assess-
ment is clinically relevant. Given the number of applications
MSAC receives for assessment, it can prioritize consideration of
assessments based on clinical need, cost, likely beneﬁt, and other
factors determined by MSAC, such as access and equity.
Using the assessment report as a basis, MSAC formulates
advice to the federal minister. If necessary, MSAC will request
further assessments or analyses from the evaluators to assist it to
come to a decision. MSAC can also rely on its previous decisions
to inform its advice. Upon forwarding its recommendations to
the Federal Department of Health and Ageing, MSAC’s formal
role is ﬁnished. The Department is responsible for making a
submission to the federal minister that combines MSAC’s ﬁnal
report, together with policy advice from the Department. To
date, the minister has endorsed all MSAC recommendations [11].
For items listed on the MBS, the government will reimburse
85% of the scheduled price (or 75%, if the patient is an inpatient
in a private hospital) and the patient is required to pay the gap.
Because in Australia doctors are able to charge in excess of the
recommended scheduled MBS listed fee, any excess would also
be paid by the patient.
In addition to including restrictions with the descriptor for an
MBS item to target use to speciﬁc indications, patient groups,
or clinical settings where optimum clinical beneﬁt and cost-
effectiveness are achieved, the government also has another
mechanism by which it can limit access to medical services—the
issue of Medicare provider numbers to doctors (and other applied
health professionals), which authorizes the practitioner to deliver
services that are reimbursable under Medicare. The Medicare
provider number uniquely identiﬁes the medical practitioner (or
health professional) and the location where they render services.
There is no automatic link between medical registration and issue
of a Medicare prescriber number. New graduates (and overseas
trained doctors) are required to satisfy certain requirements before
they are able to be issued a Medicare provider number and be
eligible to provide Medicare-reimbursed services. In addition,
MSAC can recommend that medical services only be provided at
certain specialist centers to be eligible for reimbursement.
SECTION II: CURRENT ISSUES INTHE
CONDUCT AND USE OF HTA
As the predominant use of HTA (including economic evaluation)
is within the PBAC and MSAC processes in Australia, much of
the discussion that follows is primarily in the context of these
settings.
Australia has found that a process involving the formal use of
HTA (including economic evaluation) to inform reimbursement
decision-making for health technologies is both feasible and able
to be effectively implemented. While acceptance of an evidence-
based and cost-effectiveness process in health-care decision-
making has been a little slower that advocates might have liked,
it has gradually gained acceptance across the health sector. Nev-
ertheless, there has been some resistance to the use of evidence-
based medicine to guide availability of interventions especially if
it conﬂicts with clinical freedom or reduces income to the health-
care provider [12]. For cost-effectiveness evaluation to be an
accepted part of the decision-making process, the use and accep-
tance of comparative clinical efﬁcacy as a basis for decision-
making needs to be well established. That is, there needs to be a
culture of reliance on evidence-based medicine to guide medical
practice. This can then be used as a foundation on which to build
an HTA process.
Decision-makers in Australia aim to focus on the relative
therapeutic value (i.e., the value of the health technology as
compared with best current practice) rather than simply efﬁcacy
relative to control (often placebo) as may be demonstrated in a
trial. As discussed in the guidelines published by PBAC and
MSAC, the positioning of the proposed intervention in the man-
agement algorithm for the condition of interest is required to be
explicit and the incremental effects of changing the algorithm
from current practice to practice including the intervention is of
paramount interest to the committees.
The use of HTA is now generally well accepted for the evalu-
ation of pharmaceuticals but is less so for medical technologies
(particularly for prosthesis and devices). This is partly because of
the lack of availability of high-quality evidence as this sector does
not have the same history of designing trials that correspond to
the highest levels of evidence. Also, adoption of new technologies
in the medical services areas can follow a different pathway to
that for pharmaceuticals, i.e., new technologies can be adopted
by clinicians in the absence of high-quality evidence demonstrat-
ing efﬁcacy and safety.
Relationship between Decision-Making Agencies Using
HTA and Government
As discussed in Section I, Australia has a universal health insur-
ance scheme, Medicare, based on a philosophy that medical
services should be delivered on the basis of ability to beneﬁt
rather than ability to pay. Like elsewhere, Australia has budget
constraints on public health expenditure, and HTA has proven a
useful measure to inform government, policymakers, and clini-
cians about the relative value of technologies. Nevertheless, the
successful integration of HTA into a health-care system requires
policymakers and HTA bodies, who are typically independent of
each other in their decisions, to share a mutual set of principles
underlying their decision-making. It needs to be recognized, for
example, that pursuing “value-for-money” and pursuing “cost
containment” are two quite different objectives, although often
confused and conﬂated. HTA was not introduced into Australia
with a main objective of cost containment but rather as a means
of ensuring that funding of interventions was evidence-based and
represented value-for-money.
This being said, it needs to be acknowledged that the Austra-
lian system is prone to affordability issues that generate ongoing
tensions. This reﬂects the absence of any speciﬁed decision rule to
deﬁne “acceptable cost-effectiveness,” the key role of fee-for-
service in our health insurance payment arrangements, and the
absence of any explicit expenditure caps on the MBS and PBS
schemes. The increasing availability of effective but expensive
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drugs and new technologies is likely to continue in the future.
Accepting that a tension exists between the availability of cost-
effective technologies and affordability, the key Australian HTA
arrangements (as operated by PBAC and MSAC) does nonethe-
less provide a mechanism whereby the government can justify
decisions in relation to health expenditure. To ensure that afford-
ability is considered and to ensure that the system remains sus-
tainable, the decision-making role of the PBAC is supplemented
with a requirement that new drugs with a budgetary impact
greater than $5 million be considered by the Department of
Treasury and Finance and that new drugs with a budgetary
impact greater than $10 million obtain approval from Cabinet
(the decision-makers within the elected government) before any
recommendation to make a drug available is implemented. If
necessary, additional mechanisms to limit access can be intro-
duced, policy advice may be issued, or an increase in public
contributions through copayments or taxes can be arranged.
Transparency in Assessment and Decision-Making
Pharmaceutical companies and manufacturers of some other
health technologies have been reluctant to have their submissions
to the TGA, PBAC, and MSAC released in the public domain on
the grounds that they contain commercially sensitive infor-
mation. Sponsors requesting registration or subsidy of health
technologies through these agencies are permitted to provide
information on a commercial-in-conﬁdence basis as part of their
submissions. The TGA, unlike the Food and Drug Administra-
tion in the United States and the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency, does not release any details of its evaluations.
In the past, the PBAC has accepted submissions on a
commercial-in-conﬁdence basis and the reasoning behind PBAC
decisions was not publicly disclosed. Nevertheless, the recent
Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States
has inﬂuenced the PBAC to release their reasons for decisions
publicly over the Internet, although much information (particu-
larly details of economic analyses) is not disclosed. Generally,
only summary clinical and economic information is released.
MSAC on the other hand, a more recent HTA initiative,
releases its complete evaluation report, with censoring of infor-
mation deemed commercial-in-conﬁdence. Nevertheless, the
MSAC guidelines [13] advise that “[d]ocuments in the possession
of the Department of Health and Ageing are subject to the
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. This
means that the Department may be required to grant access to
documents in its possession. Even if a document is stamped
commercial-in-conﬁdence, this does not mean that access under
this Act can be denied. Nevertheless, the Department is required
to consult with the author of the document when that document
appears to contain commercial-in-conﬁdence material, and take
the author’s views into account when deciding to grant/not grant
access to documents.” The release of the whole evaluation report
by MSAC was in response to criticisms [14] that MSAC decisions
were not clear and often at odds with the recommendations
included in the evaluation reports. Therefore, recommendations
arrived at by MSAC, and their reasoning, are publicly available
documents along with copies of the evaluation report. Included
with the reasoning is an indication as to whether commercial-
in-conﬁdence information was relied upon in coming to a
decision.
In our view, there is a strong argument that data submitted to
support a request for public subsidy should be open to public
scrutiny as public funds will be used to pay for the technologies.
Furthermore, we contend that evaluations of these data con-
ducted by government agencies should also be made available to
health professionals and consumers. The successful operation of
the system is contingent on health professionals complying with
restrictions applied to a technology and their cooperation is more
likely if they can understand the reasons behind a decision to
restrict the availability of a technology.
There have now been many calls for transparency in regula-
tory and reimbursement decisions in Australia and internation-
ally. For example, there have been calls for an international
register of clinical trials so that unfavorable results cannot be
hidden [15,16]. The Australian HTA experience has been one of
increasing transparency, in response to greater public demands
for more information about the basis on which the PBAC and
MSAC make their decisions, together with the impact of the
Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement.
Factors Inﬂuencing Decisions
Some may consider it desirable for decision-makers to designate
an explicit decision threshold (e.g., in terms of incremental cost
per additional quality-adjusted life-year [QALY] gained) as con-
stituting acceptable cost-effectiveness. Others argue that the
nomination of a decision threshold is problematic as it may
encourage “gaming” of the system (where interventions are
priced at the maximum price that results in an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER) below the threshold) and because such
formulae-driven approaches ignore other factors that inﬂuence
whether a particular estimate of incremental cost-effectiveness is
considered acceptable or not. These broader considerations
include: 1) the degree of uncertainty around the point estimate of
incremental cost-effectiveness; 2) the burden and severity of the
disease or condition; 3) the prevalence of the disease or condi-
tion; 4) the availability of alternative treatments; and 5) the net
ﬁnancial implications of making the therapy available (including
the potential for widespread use of the intervention outside any
proposed restrictions).
In Australia, neither the PBAC nor the MSAC have nomi-
nated any decision threshold as representing acceptable cost-
effectiveness and nomination of thresholds indicating that
acceptable cost-effectiveness is unlikely to occur. The role of
economic evaluation in decision-making in Australia remains as
a part of the whole and not the “end game.” Results of an
analysis conducted by Harris et al. [17] of the relative inﬂuence
of factors in decisions for public insurance coverage of new drugs
in Australia found that “there is no evidence of a ﬁxed public
threshold value of life years or QALYs, but willingness-to-pay is
clearly related to the characteristics of the clinical condition,
perceived conﬁdence in the evidence of effectiveness and its rele-
vance, as well as total cost to government.” No similar analysis
has been reported in relation to MSAC decisions; Nevertheless,
similar considerations underlie their decision-making.
As listed above, other factors, apart from economic consid-
erations, can also be considered in deciding whether a particular
estimate of incremental cost-effectiveness is “acceptable” or not.
The potential for use of an intervention beyond any restriction
that might apply (also known as “leakage”) is one of these
considerations. For example, where a drug that is listed on the
PBS for one reason may also be used for another purpose, needs
to be considered, particularly where the market authorization
(through TGA in Australia) is broader than the subsidy decision.
Examples of use beyond a restriction (leakage) include use of
therapy in patients with the same disease as those for whom the
intervention is available but in whom cost-effectiveness has not
been demonstrated (e.g., where the listing is restricted to a spe-
ciﬁc subgroup of patients with a disease, but evidence of cost-
effectiveness is not available in other subgroups). To deal with
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these potential issues, the PBAC and MSAC may require the
establishment of a risk-sharing agreement (RSA). RSAs can be
used to address at least three types of risk: 1) the overall ﬁnancial
cost to the government, which may be affected by uncertainties in
the number of patients, daily dose, and duration of therapy; 2)
cost-effectiveness of the therapy, which may be affected by the
volume of use beyond any restriction; and 3) the extent of overall
gain in health outcomes (although this is a risk that has been less
commonly addressed in RSAs). There is currently very little
information in the public domain with respect to what RSAs
have been entered into and the outcomes of these agreements.
Nevertheless, their use does appear to be increasingly adopted
where estimates of ﬁnancial implications for government budgets
may be difﬁcult to anticipate because of the issues identiﬁed
above.
Another factor that the PBAC identiﬁes as a special circum-
stance affecting its decisions is known as “rule of rescue,” which
applies in exceptional circumstances and is particularly inﬂuen-
tial in favor of listing. The following three factors need to apply
concurrently for the “rule of rescue” to be satisﬁed:
1. No alternative exists in Australia to treat patients with the
medical condition meeting the criteria of the requested
restriction. This is an absolute requirement.
2. The medical condition deﬁned by the requested restriction
is severe, progressive, and expected to lead to premature
death. The more severe the condition, or the younger the
age at which a person with the condition might die, or the
closer a person with the condition is to death, the more
inﬂuential the rule of rescue consideration is.
3. The medical condition deﬁned by the requested restriction
applies to only a very small number of patients. Again, the
fewer the patients, the more inﬂuential the rule of rescue
might be. Nevertheless, the PBAC is also mindful that the
PBS is a community-based scheme and cannot cater for
individual circumstances.
As with all considerations in the “other relevant information”
category, the rule of rescue supplements, rather than substitutes
for, the evidence-based consideration of comparative cost-
effectiveness. A decision on whether the rule of rescue is relevant
is only necessary if the PBAC would be inclined to reject a
submission based on its assessment of comparative cost-
effectiveness (and any other relevant factors).
Dealing with Uncertainty
Both the PBAC and MSAC generally require evidence that an
intervention is statistically signiﬁcantly superior to the compara-
tor before they contemplate on recommending subsidization of
the intervention at a higher price than the comparator (i.e.,
before they contemplate on the results of the supporting cost-
effectiveness analysis). Some have argued that decisions should
be based only on the mean net beneﬁts, irrespective of whether
differences are statistically signiﬁcant and that decisions based on
rules of inference will impose costs which can be measured in
terms of resources or health beneﬁts forgone [18]. It is our
opinion that using this sequential process of ﬁrst determining the
clinical beneﬁts of an intervention and then considering the eco-
nomic merits of the intervention is preferable, as the alternative
based on mean net beneﬁts gives insufﬁcient weight to genuine
clinical/policy concerns that no harm is done to patients.
Both the PBAC and MSAC guidelines request the presenta-
tion of sensitivity analysis examining the impact of varying
inputs to the economic evaluation. In addition, the guidelines
requests the presentation of a stepped economic evaluation,
which helps the committees identify the aspects of modeling that
have the greatest impact on the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio. The stepped evaluation explores the incremental effects of:
1) any adjustments to make the results of the trial applicable to
the population of interest; 2) any extrapolation beyond the time
horizon of the model; and 3) any transformation of outcomes
assessed by the trial to patient-relevant outcomes. The com-
mittees are then able to focus on assumptions in the model that
relate to the variable of interest (e.g., the degree of robustness
around estimates, whether the estimates are the most appropri-
ate, etc.). This approach makes explicit the underlying assump-
tions within the model, and allows a prioritization of the
assumptions that may have the greatest relevance to the disease
and interventions being evaluated and where the greatest uncer-
tainty may lie.
Several guidelines for HTA mandate the presentation of
probabilistic sensitivity analysis, in particular the United
Kingdom. HTA guidelines in Australia differ from those in the
United Kingdom, in that they caution against over-interpretation
of results from probabilistic sensitivity analysis, particularly
where data contributing to the analysis are not derived directly
from individual patient data collected in the context of a direct
randomized trial. Important sources of nonstatistical uncertainty
are often introduced as various discrete pieces of information are
combined with individual patient data. Statistical (probabilistic)
uncertainty involves random error and can be reduced by
increasing sample size. The many other sources of uncertainty
may involve systematic error, which are harder to identify and
cannot be reduced by increasing sample size. For example, they
arise in the selection and measurement of information, the speci-
ﬁcation of the structure of the model, and the plausibility of the
implicit and explicit assumptions relied on for the model, par-
ticularly in aggregating across the various sources of informa-
tion. Without information about the correlation between certain
variables within a model, the use of probabilistic sensitivity
analysis may not be that helpful in identifying true uncertainty.
Although probabilistic models generally allow for correlations to
be speciﬁed, this information needs to be available with some
degree of accuracy.
Both the PBAC and MSAC, in their guidelines, express a
preference for evaluations that value outcomes in terms of overall
quality and length of life, for example, in terms of QALYs gained,
which facilitates comparability across submissions. The generally
preferred method of eliciting utilities is by the repeated applica-
tion of a valid, reliable, and responsive multi-attribute utility
instrument to participants in a randomized, double-blind trial,
together with the application of an appropriate scoring algo-
rithm. Nevertheless, such instruments are not routinely included
as an outcome measure in many trials, and sometimes, it is
necessary to attach utility weights to health states not observed
with a trial. Therefore, the preferences of the reimbursement
committees of being able to compare across submissions needs to
be weighed up against the Committees’ preference for minimiz-
ing uncertainty. For this reason, the presentation of cost-utility
analysis may not be appropriate in all instances; particularly
where the transformation of health outcomes to QALYs gained
not only provides comparability but also adds an unacceptable
degree of uncertainty.
Transferability of Economic Information
As noted by Drummond and Pang [19], transferability of results
of economic evaluations across contexts may be limited by
factors including: differences in the demographic and clinical
characteristics of patients with the condition; differences in
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disease epidemiology; differences in availability of health-care
resources; variations in clinical practice; differences in costs of
health-care resources; and differences in the way a population
may value an outcome. Submissions requesting subsidy of health-
care technologies are required to present economic evaluations
that reﬂect clinical practice and costs in Australia. As a small
country (in population terms), Australia has frequently relied on
economic evaluations conducted for other jurisdictions but
adapted to make them applicable to the Australian setting. For
example, if there are differences in terms of unit costs for health-
care resources, but in other respects, the trial setting and the
Australian context are similar (e.g., results from trials are appli-
cable to the Australian population, the utilization of resources is
likely to be similar in the Australian context, the comparator
included in the evaluation reﬂects standard practice in Australia),
it should be possible to modify the economic evaluation to reﬂect
unit costs in Australia if the cost data have been reported in a
transparent way (e.g., explicit statement of the number of units
of health-care resources utilized).
More generally, there is a need for the decision-makers in
HTA to not have to be constantly reinventing the wheel. Infor-
mation on reimbursement decisions should be available in sufﬁ-
cient detail to enable decision-makers in other jurisdictions to be
able to replicate an HTA, with allowances for local conditions.
Reimbursement bodies in larger jurisdictions are encouraged to
recognize the needs of smaller stakeholders and jurisdictions.
Generating and Using Real-World Data
Real-world data are routinely used by the TGA to monitor the
safety of therapeutic goods (e.g., reports of device failure and
adverse outcomes associated with a product). To date, the PBAC
and MSAC have generally not been involved in commissioning
the generation of further evidence of the safety, effectiveness,
or cost-effectiveness of an intervention (e.g., by recommending
funding only for patients prepared to enroll in a clinical trial). As
explained in the description of MSAC processes, MSAC, unlike
the PBAC, may recommend interim funding of an intervention
where the evidence is inconclusive but suggests that the interven-
tion could be safer, more effective, and more cost-effective than
comparable procedures that attract public funding. Interim
funding enables time for data collection and further evaluation of
the intervention. A mechanism permitting conditional funding of
an intervention while further evidence is being generated might
be valuable for drugs as well as medical interventions. The topic
of funding conditional on evidence development (also known in
the literature as Coverage with Evidence Development) is a topic
likely to be discussed greatly in the literature over the next few
years.
Timing of Assessment
Different approaches to assessment will inﬂuence the timeliness
of decisions for public subsidy. If submissions to the PBAC are
received by a speciﬁed cutoff date, usually 17 weeks before the
next PBACmeeting, then the drug is considered at the next PBAC
meeting. Following the meeting, the secretariat is provided with
a summary of products that have been recommended for listing
on the PBS. This information can then be provided to the appli-
cant. On average, MSAC HTAs have taken 13 months to
complete [13].
A critical comparison is sometimes made between the time
frames applying to assessments by the PBAC and by MSAC.
Nevertheless, a comparison of the two is not entirely valid
because there are some major differences between the two assess-
ment processes. Applicants to the PBAC are required to submit a
complete assessment, which is then scrutinized by independent
evaluators and the different subcommittees which assist the
PBAC. The onus of proof in this process resides with the appli-
cant. This is in contrast to the MSAC process where applications
may be received but where a full independent HTA is commis-
sioned (more analogous to the UK National Institute for Clinical
Excellence [NICE] process). This independent assessment is the
primary basis upon which MSAC makes its decision. Thus, the
onus of proof rests with the evaluation group producing the
HTA. The MSAC process can also be delayed due to a number of
causes, not all within its control. For details, see HTA: Reﬂec-
tions from the Antipodes Value in Health Supplementary
Information, Part V at: http://www.ispor.org/publications/value/
ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp.
Continuous Innovation
The PBAC guidelines are considered a living document that is
open to regular review and improvement. The revision process is
managed by the Economic Sub-Committee (ESC) in consultation
with other stakeholders, including those who prepare submis-
sions to PBAC. One of the functions of ESC is to advise the PBAC
on technical aspects of requiring and interpreting economic
evaluations. Although no explicit selection criteria appear to
have been articulated to guide the selection of members for the
ESC, members are typically people who are active in academia
and who could be considered technical experts in a ﬁeld. Reviews
of various aspects of the PBAC process have been conducted
since its inception. For example, a review of post-PBAC meeting
processes [20] was published in 2004. It is anticipated that imple-
mentation of the recommendations of the report would result in
the period between PBAC recommendations and actual listing
being reduced to no more than 4 months [21].
The current MSAC process for assessment of medical tech-
nologies in Australia is a relatively recent development, but
already, there have been two reviews of its workings. MSAC
undertook a review of its procedures and methods in 2004, with
the ﬁnal report released in May 2005. This ﬁnal report included
both responses to the review by interested parties, responses by
MSAC, and actions agreed to by MSAC. One of the responses
to the review was the release of new guidelines for diagnostic
services (August 2005) and updated medical technologies
(September 2005). The Productivity Commission, the federal
government’s principal body for reviewing regulation and micro-
economic policy in Australia, has also produced a major report
[22] into the impacts of advances in medical technology. Never-
theless, many of the recommendations contained in this report
require action by the whole of government rather than the bodies
reviewed.
Independence, Health Policy, and Politics
Members of the PBAC and its subcommittees are independent
experts in their ﬁelds. Members are required to complete general
conﬂict of interest statements before joining the committee and at
each meeting [23]. Given that PBAC is a statutory authority, it is
relatively immune to political interference. Nevertheless, there
are instances where such interference appears to have occurred.
Two stand out. The ﬁrst involved the dissolution of the PBAC
membership in 2000. It was reported by journalists that a con-
ﬁdential background paper had been prepared for a meeting of
then Prime Minister John Howard and a group of CEOs
of pharmaceutical companies located in his electorate in 2000.
The press coverage cited aspects of the background paper, viz:
“[i]ndustry is greatly concerned about membership of the PBAC,
particularly the public hostile attitude of some members and staff
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to industry” [24]. The background paper was reported as includ-
ing comments along the lines that industry supported proposed
legislation that would enable the membership of the PBAC to be
spilled but were concerned that changes to legislation would be
held over until 2001. On December 31, 2000, PBAC and its
subcommittees were dissolved under legislation passed precipi-
tately through the Federal Senate [25].
The second example involved Herceptin, used to treat meta-
static breast cancer. It is reported that the manufacturer of Her-
ceptin had applied unsuccessfully three times to the PBAC for
PBS listing. The federal government cannot include a pharma-
ceutical product on the PBS without a PBAC recommendation to
do so. For details, see HTA: Reﬂections from the Antipodes Value
in Health Supplementary Information, Part II at: http://www.
ispor.org/publications/value/ViHsupplementary/ViH12s2_6.asp.
On December 1, 2001, following ministerial intervention, the
government implemented a new “unique” program administered
completely separately to the PBS program to ﬁnance the drug
costs of Herceptin to eligible patients [26]. It has been postulated
that it was intense lobbying that led the government to subsidize
Herceptin by creating a special program outside the normal PBS
mechanisms [27].
Members of MSAC are appointed by the Federal Minister for
Health and Ageing. As with the PBAC, MSAC members are
required to declare any conﬂict of interest at each meeting.
Where a conﬂict of interest exists, members abstain from voting
on the committee’s decisions that relate to the area where there is
such a conﬂict. It has been agreed that any conﬂicts of interest
relating to advisory panel members should be recorded, including
in assessment reports. Nevertheless, conﬂicts of interest are not a
straightforward issue in the case of the advisory panels and it is
not clear how conﬂicts of interest are managed at this level.
Clinicians are appointed to the advisory panels because of their
expertise in the area under consideration and may well be regu-
larly performing the medical procedure being assessed. They are
often not free of conﬂicts of interest, including pecuniary inter-
ests in the technology. Clinicians involved in the advisory panels,
therefore, may not necessarily take the role of impartial judge of
the clinical evidence, but rather may take the role of advocate for
the procedure/technology. There have been allegations of politi-
cal interference in MSAC decision-making and the government’s
commitment to evidence-based medicine. Ware et al. [28] allege
that, in regard to the assessment of extended Medicare funding
for positron emission tomography, which had the potential to be
a major expense for the federal government (and was occurring
shortly after a scandal and cost blowout for the government
over funding magnetic resonance imaging scans), “normal”
MSAC processes were not followed.
Parallel Trade
The term “parallel trade” or “importation” is taken to refer to
the practice where products sold by a single ﬁrm in more than
one country are imported (by third parties) from the country
where prices are lower. The Australian government does not
permit the parallel importation of pharmaceutical or medical
products. Criticisms of the statutory restrictions on parallel
imports under copyright law include that they enable unjustiﬁed
price discrimination between countries, that they hinder and
distort competition, and that they impose draconian restrictions
on international trade.
Within Australia, drug prices are reported to be low by world
standards, with prices around 60% less than US prices [29].
Given Australia’s relatively small size (representing approxi-
mately 1% of the global market), the impact of its pricing poli-
cies might be expected to be small. Nevertheless, it has become
an increasing concern for pharma as other larger markets, such
as the United States and Europe, have become ever more aware
of the disparity in prices globally (even across ﬁrst-world devel-
oped countries) and, in some cases, have begun to reference their
prices to Australia and New Zealand [30]. The decision by
several countries to legalize parallel importing has added to this
concern. To the extent that Australia is viewed to materially
contribute to the risk of untenable price reductions for the phar-
maceutical industry (due to global pricing considerations, paral-
lel import concerns, and the export of its reimbursement schemes
overseas), Australia has been threatened [31] that it will be
characterized by the industry as a country where investment
should be limited (e.g., new drugs should not be marketed here).
Nevertheless, the credibility of such threats is uncertain.
Patient and Provider Choice
The regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies in
Australia is in recognition that patients, and doctors as their
agents, have limited access to information upon which to assess
the safety and quality of these products. The regulatory mecha-
nisms provide patients and providers with a degree of conﬁdence
to enable them to participate in the health market. As noted in
the section describing the overall structure of the health system in
Australia, the aim of the national health-care funding system is to
give all Australians, regardless of their personal circumstances,
access to health care at an affordable cost or at no cost, while
allowing choice for individuals through substantial private sector
involvement in delivery and ﬁnancing [32].
Every individual in the community is able to choose their
general practitioner and through them gain referral to specialist
care. Patients in the community and their doctors have a reason-
able degree of ﬂexibility in deciding what health-care inter-
ventions should be employed to treat a patient’s condition.
Nevertheless, the government does impose some restrictions on
availability of subsidy for many health-care interventions. Where
a patient does not satisfy the restrictions, he/she may choose an
alternative that is subsidized or may elect to pay for the inter-
vention himself/herself.
Patients treated as public patients in a hospital, Nevertheless,
are not able to choose their doctor or specialist. Patient choice
with respect to interventions delivered in public hospitals is
limited by whether the hospital provides the procedure and
whether the patient is eligible to receive the treatment under any
restrictions the hospital imposes on availability of that interven-
tion. Patients with private health insurance are able to choose
their doctors. Doctors in the private sphere are able to provide
medical services or procedures that are not reimbursed through
the MBS, but patients bear the full cost. Listing on the MBS
increases the number of patients for which medical services are
affordable. Private patients in both public or private hospitals
can gain earlier access to new technology compared with public
patients [33].
Effects on Budgets, Reimbursements, and Access
Total health expenditure in Australia was 9.7% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2003 to 2004, up from 8.3% in 1993 to 1994.
Most of this increase has been funded from growth in federal
government health expenditure, which has increased from 3.7%
to 4.4% of GDP. This rate of increase was around double that of
both the private sector (from 2.8% to 3.1% of GDP) and state
and local governments (from 1.8% to 2.2% of GDP) [34].
Figure 2 depicts the change in expenditure on health (by
source of funding) over time [35].
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Government budgets for health interventions are adminis-
tered as part of the overall general health budget. HTA has direct
policy relevance in Australia as it is part of health service funding
within the Australian setting and forms the basis on which most
new interventions are taken up, unlike countries such as Canada
in which the role of HTA does not appear to directly inform
decision-making [36]. The Medicare health-care system is con-
trolled by a number of regulatory constraints. Direct budget caps
constrain public hospital spending and most of the smaller
health-care and aged-care programs. Medical services (MBS) and
drugs (PBS) are uncapped, Nevertheless, and are characterized by
fee-for-service arrangements. Affordability and sustainability of
the MBS/PBS systems has been an ongoing policy issue for gov-
ernments of both political persuasions in Australia. Restrictions
on the supply of doctors through limits on medical school intakes
and doctor immigration have been used to control Medicare
outlays, but this is a blunt instrument that can deliver embarrass-
ing shortfalls. Increasing patient copayments to dampen demand
for services and reduce government outlays is another policy
approach, but this can have unwelcome equity implications.
While there are no explicit caps on expenditures on the PBS, the
growth in expenditure is carefully monitored and positive rec-
ommendations with projected costs over $10 million must go to
Cabinet for approval.
Despite these affordability concerns, Australia has been rela-
tively successful at controlling health-care costs, has an extensive,
well-developed and easily accessible health-care system, and a
skilled health workforce. It achieves better health outcomes than
many comparable countries. In terms of the health outcomes
obtained from investment in health care, apart from some spe-
ciﬁc population groups, such as the Aboriginal population, Aus-
tralia has high levels of population health, long life expectancy,
and low infant mortality (estimated at 4.57 deaths per 1000 live
births) [37]. Central to this effort are the Medicare and PBS
programs and continued high levels of government involvement
in health-care funding and delivery. Australians recognize this by
their continued high level of support for these programs.
SECTION III: LESSONS FOR
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
HTA in Australia has developed in response to the needs of the
Australian health-care system, involving a mix of public and
private health-care providers. The Australian system is frag-
mented (drugs vs. medical services, federal vs. states, public vs.
private systems) and duplication can occur in HTA assessment
[38]. It is argued that this may be justiﬁed as the evaluation needs
of drugs and medical services differ, with drugs having a longer
history of reliance on clinical evidence and more straightforward
evaluation methods compared to medical services. Furthermore,
it is important to recognize that the different funders, state versus
federal and private versus public, have differing responsibilities
that may be best served by dedicated evaluation efforts [39].
Nevertheless, it remains a task for the Australian system to
improve its level of efﬁciency and remove any unnecessary dupli-
cation, especially as people with the skill set required to carry out
HTA is quite limited and duplication can result in exercises more
concerned with moving the cost of providing services to other
payers than with the most efﬁcient way to provide services.
The key weaknesses in the Australian system can best be
summarized as:
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Figure 2 Change in expenditure on health (by source of funding) in Australia over time.
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1. the use of silo budgeting;
2. focus on clinical decision and not public health;
3. lack of attention to disinvestments; and
4. capacity to fund/instigate research
The health of the Australian community can be affected by a
broad range of government policies, such as health care, taxa-
tion, employment, education, housing, transport, regional devel-
opment, and social security. Therefore, a cohesive approach
across various government portfolios would result in the most
efﬁcient use of resources. Nevertheless, in Australia as elsewhere,
funding of services potentially affecting health status (e.g.,
housing, education, environment, health care, etc.) is compart-
mentalized, not only across broad areas, but even within an area.
For example, funding of health technologies in Australia is com-
partmentalized with separate funding for various programs (PBS,
MBS, hospitals, etc) and is likely to result in “silo” decision-
making. In the conduct of ﬁnancial analyses for MSAC and
PBAC, there is only limited consideration of the opportunity cost
of funds that may be spent on a proposed health technology. For
example, if a new drug becomes available to treat Alzheimer’s,
the ﬁnancial analysis would identify the additional expenditure
for the PBS budget; Nevertheless, potential other uses of the
funds (e.g., provision of assistance to carers of patients with
Alzheimer’s) are rarely considered.
One of the biggest challenges for government is coordination
of decision-making not only across various portfolios but across
health-care services. The Australian approach has led to chal-
lenges when trying to evaluate interventions that cross over agen-
cies, as it is difﬁcult to determine which agency should have
overarching responsibility. For example, photodynamic therapy
(PDT) with verteporﬁn, in which the PDT part of the health
intervention is listed on the MBS and verteporﬁn is listed on the
PBS.
Also, this “silo budgeting” mentality has kept the focus of
HTA in Australia on clinical care decisions as opposed to the
wider issue of population health and the use of HTA in evaluat-
ing preventative interventions with a public health objective. The
exceptions here are screening interventions and a number of
researcher initiated studies funded through competitive research
grants. With that said, Nevertheless, other reasons aside from
“silo budget” mentality may contribute to this lack of HTA
emphasis on public health interventions, as in this area, develop-
ment of a rigorous evidence base provides greater challenges.
Even though some quite sophisticated models have been pro-
posed to address the complexity of modeling public health inter-
ventions, the lack of well-designed and credible efﬁcacy results
inhibit this area the most.
Another weakness of the Australian HTA process, a weakness
shared with HTA in other countries, is the issue of “disinvest-
ments.” The Australian HTA process is mainly user led, that is,
responding to applications from industry or users of the proce-
dures (although it is reported that around 30% of MSAC work
involves requests from the Federal Department of Health and
Ageing). There is not a clear process by which old technologies,
which are receiving subsidies, are evaluated and if found to be
not cost-effective, are removed from listings. The use of evidence
as a basis for decision-making should include the need for more
routine evaluation of old technologies to be included as part of
the HTA system. The exception to this is where a “drug” or
“medical service” has been found to be unsafe, in which case,
speedy removal from reimbursement listings occurs.
Although Australia has introduced horizon scanning which
allows the federal and state departments of health to identify any
emerging medical technologies that may inﬂuence future health-
care systems, current HTA bodies are not able to instigate any
direct research in areas where they may think the evidence is
insufﬁcient for robust decision-making. This is in contrast to the
NICE in the United Kingdom, which increasingly is able to
nominate areas in which more research is needed, to enable a
more robust scientiﬁc assessment of research questions, or to
generate data for emerging areas such as preventative interven-
tions. Hopefully, future funding will be made available to allow
HTA agencies in Australia to instigate their own research
agendas in collaboration with the public.
Conclusion
There are inevitably tensions between the objectives of achieving:
1) a rigorous evidence-based assessment; 2) administrative feasi-
bility; and 3) due process. In Australia, for example, these ten-
sions have been found to exist between:
• The level of assessment required to be presented to the
committees and the tractability of the reimbursement
process. The information requirements for a PBAC and
MSAC submission have increased over time with the devel-
opment of the guidelines. As information requirements and
the complexity of analyses presented increase, the process
becomes more difﬁcult to manage and also becomes more
expensive (particularly with respect to time). The average
duration of a PBAC meeting, for example, has increased
from 2 days to 3 days in recent years.
• The furnishing of due process to stakeholders and timeliness
of the reimbursement process. As more opportunities are
provided for stakeholders to respond to various inputs to
the decision-making process, the more time will be required
to reach the point of decision. The frequency of PBAC
meetings was reduced from quarterly to tri-annually in
2004 to permit greater feedback to sponsors through the
process.
It is not clear yet from the Australian experience whether the
appropriate balance between analytic rigor, administrative feasi-
bility, and due process has been achieved. Finding this balance is
an ongoing enterprise that requires goodwill and collaboration
from all stakeholders.
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